COOTER (TO PRINTER).DOC

9/24/2019 9:51 AM

Hand Rule Damages for
Incompensable Losses†

ROBERT COOTER*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1097
COMPENSABLE HARMS .................................................................................... 1099
INCOMPENSABLE LOSSES ................................................................................. 1100
PURE RISK ....................................................................................................... 1103
CONFUSION IN THE COURTS ............................................................................. 1105
COST OF A FATAL RISK .................................................................................... 1108
HAND RULE DAMAGES .................................................................................... 1112
EFFICIENCY ..................................................................................................... 1115
FAIRNESS ......................................................................................................... 1116
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 1120

I. INTRODUCTION
Compensatory damages often aim to make the victim whole or to
restore the victim to a position equivalent to the one before the harm
occurred. Two compensatory ideals coexist in law. First, market value
compensation is perfect when damages equal the price of a substitute.
† Although not defined in dictionaries, I am using the terms “incompensable”
and “noncompensable” to describe those losses for which one cannot find a money
equivalent by any amount of effort, deliberation, or experience.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. For useful comments,
help, and references, I am grateful to Adi Ayal, Ariel Porat, Theodore Eisenberg, Debby
Kearney, Kyle Logue, Kenneth Simons, Francesco Parisi, Ben Zipursky, and participants
in the symposium entitled “Baselines and Counterfactuals in the Theory of Compensatory
Damages: What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate?” held at the University of San
Diego School of Law, February 28, 2003.
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Second, subjective value compensation is perfect when the victim is
indifferent between “no harm” and “harm plus damages.” In some
circumstances, neither ideal of compensation is achievable. For
example, when a child dies in an accident, the court cannot base
damages on the child’s market value, because markets for children are
illegal. Nor can the court compute subjective value on the repugnant
formula, “Find a sum of money such that the parents are indifferent
between having a dead child and the money, or having a living child and
no money.” The loss of a child is an extreme example of incompensable
losses that frequently occur in lesser forms.
In finding damages, courts distinguish between economic and
noneconomic losses. For economic losses, such as lost wages or medical
costs, the court computes market values and awards damages accordingly.
For economic losses of goods whose subjective value differs from
market value, such as family photographs, expert testimony uses methods
that help courts to guess at subjective values.1 However, for noneconomic
losses such as companionship, consort, sexual partnership, affection, or
pain and suffering, courts apparently arrive at damages by unaided
intuition.
Judges and juries need a clear theory and replicable practice for
computing damages for incompensable losses, which should build on
familiar risk valuations. Because everyone faces a small risk of death in
daily life, even loving parents must decide how much to spend on
reducing these risks to their children. In general, the need to buy costly
precaution in daily life forces people to trade off money and risk. Social
norms often evolve to prescribe the right balance. In favorable circumstances
the process of norm creation overcomes personal biases and cognitive
errors, so the social standard can withstand scrutiny and criticism. The
“reasonable person,” who is common law’s guide, internalizes these norms.
Courts should develop theory and practice of damages for incompensable
losses based on the response of reasonable people to daily risks.
Specifically, courts should compute damages based on the reasonable
person’s point of indifference between less risk and more expenditure on
precaution. The Hand rule describes this point of indifference.2 In its
original notation, the Hand rule is based on the equation B = P x L,
where B is the burden of precaution, P is the reduction in probability of
harm caused by precaution, x is the multiplication sign, and L is
1. Examples of techniques are hedonic indexes, revealed preferences, and price of
closest market substitute. See, e.g., C. LANIER BENKARD & PATRICK BAJARI, HEDONIC
PRICE INDEXES WITH UNOBSERVED PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS, AND APPLICATION TO
PC’S (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w9980, 2003), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~lanierb/research/pi090103.pdf.
2. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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liability.3 The equation describes the tipping point between negligent
and nonnegligent behavior. If B equals or exceeds P x L, then the behavior
is nonnegligent. If P x L exceeds B, then the behavior is negligent.
Assume the court can identify ideal examples of behavior satisfying
this equation. By “ideal,” I mean that most people agree that the
precaution in question is reasonable. By computing the burden B and
probability P in these ideal examples, the court can solve the equation
for liability L. In general, Hand rule damages equal the reasonable
burden divided by the reduction in the probability of harm that it causes,
or L = B /P.
Applying the Hand rule to good social norms for safety will yield
reasonable values of damages. To illustrate numerically, assume that a
reasonable person would spend $100 to reduce the probability of
accidental death by 1/10,000. Solving the equation $100 = (1/10,000) x
L for L yields the conclusion that courts should award damages of $1
million for wrongful death.
Hand rule damages have some normatively desirable properties that I
will explain in this Article. First, Hand rule damages cause potential
injurers to internalize the value of the reduction in risk from their
precautions. Consequently, Hand rule damages provide incentives for
efficient precaution. This fact appeals to economists and utilitarians.
Second, “internalization” means that potential injurers treat risks to
others like their own risks. This fact appeals to moralists. Third, given
complete insurance markets, liability for exposure to risk tends to have
the same effects as Hand rule damages for actual losses. Insofar as
liability for exposure to risk satisfies the principle of corrective justice,
so do Hand rule damages in the presence of idealized markets. This fact
appeals to some philosophers of corrective justice.
II. COMPENSABLE HARMS
Utility curves in economics represent points of subjective indifference
for an individual. Perfect subjective compensation for a loss is a sum of
money that restores the victim to the utility curve where he would have
been but for the injury. In general, purchasing a perfect substitute
restores the victim to the same subjective utility as before the accident.
Consequently, the market price of a perfect substitute equals perfect
subjective compensation.
3.

Id.
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Before proceeding to incompensable losses, I mention a few details
about compensation. Market compensation differs according to whether
the victim can buy and sell the good in question, buy it only, or sell it
only. To illustrate the three types: The owner of a barrel of oil can buy
or sell it; a person can often buy better health but not sell it; and the
owner of a unique good like an impressionist painting can initially sell it
but cannot buy it after an accident destroys it.
Now I relate these facts to damages. With a homogenous good, like
oil, that the victim can buy or sell, the subjective value equals the market
price.4 Consequently, perfect market compensation is also perfect
subjective compensation. With a personal good like health that the
victim could buy but not sell, perfect market compensation equals or
exceeds perfect subjective compensation. With a unique good like an
impressionist painting that the victim could have sold before the accident
but cannot buy after it is destroyed, perfect market compensation equals
or falls short of perfect subjective compensation.
III. INCOMPENSABLE LOSSES
Now my analysis turns from compensable to incompensable losses.
Economic theorists often assume that preference orderings are complete,
which means that the actor can order every alternative relative to every
other alternative. “Order” means the actor can say whether one is better,
equally good, or worse than the other. In reality, choosing requires
effort, so people often do not order possible alternatives until they
materialize as actual choices. In most cases, however, people can order
alternatives when required. For example, most of us do not think
seriously about whether we would rather lose our sight or our hearing,
but if bizarre circumstances forced us to choose, most of us could make
the choice. The important point is that orderings are usually incomplete
and people can usually complete them when necessary.
This generalization applies to nonmarket goods. By definition, people
do not have experience with buying or selling nonmarket goods.
Consequently, most people have not thought about their money value. If
circumstances force us to choose, most of us can find monetary
equivalents. For example, I do not know how much I would be willing
to pay for a twenty-five percent reduction in the pollution of the air that I
breathe, but I would figure it out if faced with the possibility of buying
it. Similarly, I do not know how much I would accept for a fifteen
percent decrease in my visual acuity, but I could figure it out if faced
4. In more technical language, there is no consumer surplus on the purchase of
the last unit of a homogeneous good.
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with the possibility of selling it. I use the phrase “commensurable with
money in principle” if a reasonable person could find a money
equivalent for a nonmarket good when faced with the opportunity to buy
or sell it.
For some things, however, many people cannot find a money
equivalent by any amount of effort, deliberation, or experience. The
death of a child is an example of an alternative that, for most parents, is
incommensurable with money in principle. Incommensurability has
several causes. A psychological cause is the constraint imposed by
categories of thought. If “money” and “death” are different categories
of thought, connecting them may be too difficult for some people, no
matter how hard they try. Another kind of psychological cause occurs
when money crowds out intrinsic motivation. Crowding out is illustrated
by the question, “How much money must I pay you to love me for my
own sake?” The question makes no sense because it confuses the way
money connects to love. Psychology apparently precludes buying and
selling love or affection.
Morality provides another cause of incommensurability with money.
If I believe that buying or selling something is immoral, then morality
precludes a money equivalent. To illustrate, if I am morally committed
not to sell my body parts at any price, then the question, “How much
money would you take for your eye?” inappropriately suggests that some
amount of money might influence my answer. Asking a morally
committed person the preceding question resembles asking a loving
husband, “When did you stop beating your wife?” The question cannot
be answered without reformulating it.
Generalizing, Joseph Raz has argued that a norm is an “exclusionary
reason,” meaning that it excludes the actor from allowing himself to be
influenced by some considerations.5 If a person is committed to a norm
that excludes payment as a way to acquire or part with something, then
that thing is incommensurable with money in that person’s principles. I
will develop a theory of damages that proceeds from the fact that some
people regard certain losses as incommensurable with money. I will not
consider the philosophical question of whether these people are right.
Incommensurability in principle has a significant place in constitutional
reasoning and adjudication. Many U.S. judges interpret the Constitution
5. This concept is central to Raz’s theory of norms developed in JOSEPH RAZ,
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35–48 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1975).
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as giving so much weight to individual rights that material considerations
cannot justify their infringement by the state.6 Political philosophies
with long pedigrees bolster courts in western countries that refuse to
trade off individual rights for wealth. For example, one of the most
celebrated political treatises of our age, John Rawls’s A Theory of
Justice, contends that a society with moderate scarcity should not
sacrifice liberty for wealth.7 According to this view, no increase in
wealth can justify, say, a restriction on the freedom of speech. When
faced with a public choice, officials who follow this philosophy should
always choose more liberty, according to Rawls, even at the cost of a
large loss of wealth. Consequently, liberty is regarded as “lexically
prior” to wealth in the court’s preference ordering.8
I have analyzed some forms and causes of incommensurability. In my
analysis, incommensurability is relative to the values of an actor. The
relevant actor for determining legal questions in common law is the
“reasonable person.” This fact suggests how the law should distinguish
between compensable and incompensable losses. If a loss is commensurable
with money for a reasonable person, then the loss is legally compensable. If
a loss is incommensurable with money for the reasonable person, then
the loss is legally incompensable.
Like losses, the risk of a loss can be compensable or incompensable.
To illustrate compensable risk, most people will only pay so much to
avoid exposure to the risk of a particular harm. People do this when
purchasing safer automobiles. To illustrate incompensable risk, some
people apparently believe that no amount of money is worth the risk that
their immortal soul will be condemned to hell. Similarly, the risk that a
catastrophic war will destroy humanity may not be worth any amount of
money.
This Article is built on the fact that many incompensable losses
correspond to compensable risks. For example, a person will only spend
so much to reduce the small risk that his child will die in an automobile
accident, but no amount of money will compensate for the child’s death.
To appreciate the connection between probability and incommensurability,
assume that money provides perfect compensation for the risk when the
6. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 360 (1972) (holding that a
durational residence requirement for Tennessee voters unconstitutionally restricted the
fundamental rights to vote and to interstate travel); ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC
CONSTITUTION 257–58 (2000).
7. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
8. In Rawls’s system, however, liberties can trade off against each other. To
illustrate, a restriction on the freedom of speech might be justified by a resulting increase
in the freedom of religion. Rawls’s system logically requires a way to combine different
liberties in order to say whether the total bundle of liberty is less or more. See id. at 42–
43, 60–61.
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probability is low, but as the probability rises towards one, the risk
approaches a certain loss and the loss is incompensable. In many cases,
a compensable risk turns into an incompensable loss as the probability
rises towards one.
Note that the region where the risk becomes incompensable is also the
region where the injurer’s behavior is usually worse than negligent. An
injurer who imposes a risk with a high probability of materializing is
grossly negligent or commits an intentional tort. These are circumstances
where punishment is appropriate. Tort law requires a separate theory of
punitive damages that this Article does not discuss.
IV. PURE RISK
To recapitulate, people necessarily lack experience with buying and
selling nonmarket goods. Many of these goods are commensurable with
money in principle. For losses that are commensurable with money in
principle, a court can, if necessary, find a money equivalent by
established methods. These methods aim for objective compensation
based on market prices or subjective compensation based on
indifference. However, some losses are incommensurable with money in
principle. For common law purposes, a good is incommensurable with
money in principle if a reasonable person would not buy or sell it. For
losses that are incommensurable with money, damages should be based
on a reasonable person’s response to risk of the loss that actually
materialized. Before developing this method, however, I will explain
the concept of pure risk.
The following example helps to disentangle compensable and
incompensable losses and to isolate the element of pure risk.
Cancer Example: Victim V works at a job where he might be
accidentally exposed to a chemical that increases the probability
from .01 to .02 of dying from lung cancer in twenty years. V would
pay $15,000 to avoid exposure to this risk, or he would accept
$15,000 to expose himself to this risk. No matter how hard he tries,
V cannot imagine any sum of money that he would accept in
exchange for certain death by lung cancer.
V’s employer accidentally exposes him to the chemical. As a result of
exposure, V spends $1000 to move to another neighborhood with better
air quality, and V’s insurer raises his health and life insurance premiums
by an amount that totals $2000 over twenty years. V also suffers fear

1103

COOTER (TO PRINTER).DOC

9/24/2019 9:51 AM

and anxiety for twenty years, which he would have paid $5000 to avoid.
Assume that compensation for exposure to risk is paid just before
twenty years, when V still does not know whether or not the risk will
materialize. How much compensation should be paid?
Alternatively, assume that no compensation is paid for exposure to
risk, the risk materializes after twenty years, and V dies abruptly from
lung cancer without incurring further costs. How much damages should
be paid to V’s heirs?
I begin to answer these questions by computing damages for exposure
to risk. Because V would have paid $15,000 to avoid exposure, and he
would have accepted $15,000 to submit to exposure, $15,000 in damages
makes him indifferent between no risk and risk-and-damages. V’s full
compensation for exposure to risk thus equals $15,000. If V is a
reasonable person, then the court should award compensatory damages
of $15,000 for exposure to risk.
Note that $15,000 encompasses $3000 in objective costs and $5000 in
psychological suffering. By objective costs, I mean the costs actually paid
out of V’s pocket. By psychological suffering, I mean the subjective
cost of the feelings caused by exposure to risk. Note, however, that risk
is costly quite apart from any feelings that exposure to it causes. Even if
V had such a calm disposition that exposure to risk did not cause anxiety
or fear, or even if he did not know about his exposure to the risk,
exposure to risk is still something that he would pay to avoid. I call the
additional subjective cost the cost of pure risk. The cost of pure risk
equals the amount that a person would pay to avoid it, minus out-ofpocket costs or psychological costs caused by it. In the cancer example,
the objective costs of $3000 and the psychological costs of $5000 sum to
less than the total perfect compensation cost, which is $15,000. The
$7000 difference represents the cost of pure risk. Most people are very
averse to the risk of large losses and would pay a lot to avoid them.
Hence the cost of pure risk is a large element in the total cost of
exposure to large risks. Compensating for objective and psychological
consequences without compensating for pure risk grossly undercompensates
for exposure to the risk of large losses.9
Note that the cost of pure risk explains my earlier claim that many
accidents involve an element of incompensable loss. Specifically, most
people are highly averse to large losses. As the probability of a large
loss approaches one, many people may find that they would not accept
any amount of money in exchange for exposure to the pure risk of such a
9. For a good discussion of risk in tort law, see ARIAL PORAT & ALEX STEIN,
TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 101–29 (2001).
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loss. In the typical case of a large loss involving physical harm, there
are compensable elements and an incompensable element.
The second question posed by the cancer example is how to
compensate V’s heirs for the materialized loss. Recall that V cannot
imagine any sum of money that he would accept in exchange for certain
death by lung cancer, so the materialized harm is incompensable. If V is
a reasonable person, then the court should acknowledge that the
materialized loss is incompensable. In these circumstances, subjective
indifference provides no basis for damages. Hand rule damages provide a
solution. As mentioned above, Hand rule damages equal the reasonable
burden of precaution divided by the resulting reduction in the probability
of harm. In this example, V is indifferent between $15,000 and an
increase of 0.01 in the probability of cancer death. Thus, Hand rule
damages equal $15,000/0.01, or $1.5 million. Note that Hand rule
damages encompass all aspects of a fatal risk that the individual would
pay to reduce, including out-of-pocket losses, psychological costs, and
pure risk. Later, I will explain and defend this method of computing
damages, but first I turn to the actual practice of the courts.
V. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS
Modern practices of awarding damages for accidental deaths
developed in response to the historic common law principle that if the
victim dies before recovering in tort, the right of action also dies for the
victim and the victim’s relatives and dependents.10 An implication of
this principle is that damages are often much lower when the injurer
accidentally kills someone rather than injuring him. This result creates
perverse incentives and strikes most people as unfair. The United States
overcame the restrictive common law principle by enacting wrongful
death statutes, which created a right of relatives and dependents to
recover their own losses from the victim’s death.11 Some U.S. states also
enacted survival statutes, which created a right of relatives and
dependents to recover the deceased’s losses, including suffering that
occurred after the injury and before dying.12
10. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§
125A, 127 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). Keeton and Prosser also list another
restriction that I do not discuss. If the tortfeasor died before the victim recovered, his
liability died with him. Id. § 125A.
11. See id. § 127.
12. See id. § 126.
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Wrongful death statutes often enumerate categories of recoverable and
nonrecoverable losses, including a distinction between economic or
pecuniary losses and noneconomic or nonpecuniary losses. For
economic losses, courts can rely on the parties to compute damages by
replicable methods. For homogenous goods, damages can equal market
prices. For unique goods such as art works, courts can use the market
price of the closest substitute that recently sold. For complex goods,
statisticians can sometimes attribute market value to the good’s
components. For example, statisticians can impute the implicit market
value of clean air from differences in real estate prices among
neighborhoods that differ in air quality (“hedonic index”). When
subjective values substantially exceed market values, as with family
photographs, courts try to infer subjective values by indirect means.
State statutes that allow compensation for noneconomic losses often
list some of their types. To illustrate, the Kansas statute allows heirs to
recover for the following losses: “(1) [m]ental anguish, suffering or
bereavement; (2) loss of society, companionship, comfort or protection;
(3) loss of marital care, attentions, advice or counsel; (4) loss of filial
care or attention; (5) loss of parental care, training, guidance or
education.”13 This Kansas statute allows recovery for “intangible emotional
losses,” including grief.14 A separate Kansas statute limits nonpecuniary
damages to $250,000.15
Similarly, the recommended jury instruction for California’s courts
has the judge tell the jury:
You should also consider:
1. The age of the deceased and of each heir;
2. The health of the deceased and each heir immediately prior to death;
3. The respective life expectancy of the deceased and of each heir;
4. Whether the deceased was kindly, affectionate or otherwise;
5. The disposition of the deceased to contribute financially to support the heirs;
6. The earning capacity of the deceased;
7. The deceased’s habits of industry and thrift; and
8. Any other facts shown by the evidence indicating what benefits
each heir might reasonably have been expected to receive from
the deceased had [he] [she] lived.
....
In determining the loss which each heir has suffered, do not consider:
1. Any pain or suffering of the decedent;
2. Any grief or sorrow of the heirs; or
3. The poverty or wealth of any heir.16

13. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 315
(2d ed. 2000) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1994)).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903(a)).
16. 2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, BAJI 14.50, at 232–33 (9th ed. 2002)

1106

COOTER (TO PRINTER).DOC

[VOL. 40: 1097, 2003]

9/24/2019 9:51 AM

Hand Rule Damages for Incompensable Losses
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The Kansas statute and the California jury instruction tell the
decisionmaker some things to look for when setting damages but not
what to do with what it sees. In mathematical terms, these instructions
list the variables in the damage function but remain silent about its form.
Besides these lists, jury instructions on incompensable losses seem
vacuous or incoherent. The State of Massachusetts offers these instructions:
Recovery for wrongful death represents damages to the survivors for the
loss of value of decedent’s life.
There is no special formula under the law to assess the plaintiff’s
damages.
It is your obligation to assess what is fair, adequate, and just. You must
use your wisdom and judgment and your sense of basic justice to translate
into dollars and cents the amount which will fully, fairly, and reasonably
compensate the next of kin for the death of the decedent. You must be
guided by your common sense and your conscience on the evidence of the
case.17

As I have explained, many people cannot commensurate a person’s
death with money. The instruction to find the economic value of losses
incommensurable with money makes no sense to them. Even so,
Massachusetts commends its judges to tell the jury to compensate
“fully” for incompensable losses by using its “common sense.” This
instruction resembles a homeless person saying, “Meet me at my house
and use your common sense to find it.”
Compared to Massachusetts, the recommended jury instruction in
New York is apparently worse. The New York jury instruction says that
damages should be awarded only for the deceased’s economic or
pecuniary value.
[I]t is the economic value of [the deceased] to [the distributee] that you
must decide. That value is incapable of exact proof. Taking into account
(first alterations in original).
17. 1 PAUL R. SUGARMAN & VALERIE A. YARASHUS, MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR
COURT CIVIL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.5 (2001) (footnotes omitted). The
instruction goes on to explain that the wrongful death statutes entitle the survivors “to
recover the fair monetary value of the decedent to them, including, but not limited to,
compensation for the loss of . . . society, companionship, [and] comfort . . . of the
decedent.” Id. § 3.6 (footnote omitted). The instruction explains that the survivors’ pain
and suffering must go uncompensated, but the pain and suffering of the victim between
the time of injury and death should be compensated as follows:
To arrive at a monetary figure for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, you must
use your own good sense, background, and experience in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable figure to compensate for the physical and
mental suffering such as you find has been proved by the evidence.
Id. § 3.12.
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all the factors I have discussed, you must use your own common sense and
sound judgment based on the evidence in determining the amount of the
economic loss . . . .18

In a case where New York parents lose a child, the jury is to use its
common sense to find the economic value of the child’s love and
companionships. Like Massachusetts, the New York jury is asked to use
common sense to monetize what is incommensurable with money.
Unlike Massachusetts, the New York jury is asked to monetize only the
economic part of a loss that is incommensurable with money. Avoiding
unacceptable outcomes in states that disallow noneconomic damages
requires even more than the usual contortions by juries and judges.19
Compared to Massachusetts and New York, the California jury
instruction is somewhat better. Unlike New York, the California jury is told
that it can compensate for noneconomic damages. Unlike Massachusetts
and New York, the California jury instruction does not suggest that
common sense can solve a problem that lies outside the range of ordinary
experience. Rather, California recommends doing what is reasonable:
“Also, you should award reasonable compensation for the loss of love,
companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support[,] . . .
and any loss of the enjoyment of sexual relations].”20 This single sentence,
however, comprises the entire California instruction on noneconomic
damages. The jury is told nothing about how to determine a reasonable
amount of damages. Hand rule damages are reasonable, although they are
also too difficult conceptually for common sense to encompass. The
California instruction thus leaves open the possibility of developing a
concrete method for determining reasonable damages. Without a theory
like Hand rule damages, however, the instruction to award reasonable
compensation is hardly better than the instruction to follow common sense.
VI. COST OF A FATAL RISK
Having described the confusion of courts, I turn to the task of
developing a theory and practice of damages for incompensable losses. I
have explained that incompensable losses involve goods that people do
not buy and sell. In contrast, daily life exposes everyone to the need to

Id.

18. 1B NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL 2:320, at 1428 (3d ed. 2002).
19. See GLANNON, supra note 13, at 314.
The inadequacy of the pecuniary loss standard is most glaring when the
decedent is a young child. In such cases, the emotional loss to the parents is
frightful, yet there is seldom evidence or likelihood of actual financial loss to
the survivors. Such compelling cases have led many courts to evade the
strictures of the pecuniary loss standard by tortured interpretation.
20.
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spend money and effort to reduce the risk of incompensable losses.
When precaution is costly, buying it forces people to trade off money
and risk, including searching for the point of indifference between them.
Economists have long used behavior towards risk to impute the
subjective value of the loss, including loss of life, and estimate it by
econometric methods.21 I refer to these estimates as the subjective cost
of a fatal risk, although economists typically use the unfortunate phrase,
“value of a life.”
To illustrate, the Victoria Transport Policy Institute’s analysis of the
safety and health costs of automobiles surveyed the econometric studies.
It concluded that the narrow measure based on market costs of property
damages, medical treatment, and lost productivity typically value saving
a human life at $500,000 to $1 million, whereas the comprehensive
approach based on people’s willingness to pay for increased safety put
the value in the range of $2 to $7 million.22 Several publications of the
United States Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) discuss and endorse this method for assigning social costs to
automobile accidents. According to these FHWA studies, the social cost
of a life lost in an automobile accident during 1994 was approximately
$2.6 million.23 More recently, Kip Viscusi had said that the correct
number is $3 to $9 million.24 Most recently, the Environmental Protection
Agency’s expert panel recommended the value of $5.8 million in 1997
dollars for cost-benefit studies involving the loss of a statistical life. 25
This approach has also been used to compute the implicit value of
21. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW ¶ 71.03, at 343–44
(1999). The authors of one study calculated the value of a life to be $176,000. Id. at 344
n.14 (citing Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from
the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 265, 292 (Nestor E.
Terleckyj ed., 1976)). Another economist calculated the value of a life to be over $1
million. Id. at 344 n.15 (citing W. Kip Viscusi, Labor Market Valuations of Life and
Limb: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 26 PUB. POL’Y 359, 372–85 (1978)).
22. VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., TRANSPORTATION COST AND BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES, ESTIMATES AND IMPLICATIONS 5.3-7 (2003), available at
http://www.vtpi.org/tca/tca0503.pdf.
23. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TECHNICAL ADVISORY: MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS COSTS tbl. 2 (1994), http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/
techadvs/t75702.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
24. W. KIP VISCUSI, MISUSES AND PROPER USES OF HEDONIC VALUES OF LIFE 5
(Harvard Law School Discussion Paper No. 292, 2000), http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olin_center/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
25. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES
90 (2000), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html.
Thanks to Richard Ravesz for this reference.
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fatal risks in federal safety regulations. Viscusi found that the cost per
life saved by various regulations varies from $100,000 for unvented space
heaters to $72 billion for the 1987 formaldehyde standard.26 Although
the numbers in these estimates are questionable, Viscusi’s implication is
undoubtedly correct that Americans could save many lives by changing the
pattern of safety expenditures without increasing total safety expenditures.27
I have been discussing the subjective cost of fatal risks as revealed by
the precautions of people, which economists routinely use in analyzing
safety standards. Commentators sometimes ask whether this approach
should be used to set damages. Landes and Posner discussed this
possibility briefly in their 1987 torts book and tentatively concluded in
favor of courts adopting this approach.28 Shavell’s 1987 torts book did
not discuss this possibility.29 Viscusi, who favors using this method to
set standards of care, opposes using it to set damages. He argues that
using this method to set damages will result in overinsurance.30
Is the subjective value of a fatal risk more or less than the damages
that courts award in wrongful death cases? Available data is usually
aggregated in a way that precludes answering this question. In 1996, the
Federal Department of Justice and the National Center on State Courts
conducted a large survey of state court civil cases.31 Extracting the awards
in wrongful death cases from this data seems to be the most promising
approach. Towards this end, Theodore Eisenberg generously made some
calculations for me.32 Table 1 concerns those cases won by plaintiffs
asserting a wrongful death claim. The mean, median, and standard
26. W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1432–35 (1996).
27. Id. at 1432–36.
28. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 86–90 (1987). Landes and Posner describe how to compute the implicit value
of a life from expenditures on precaution and the resulting reduction in the probability of
an accident, and they conclude that “this may be a feasible as well as theoretically
correct method of estimating tort damages. The tort system shows, as yet, no signs of
moving in this direction; it continues to be wedded to the pecuniary-loss measure, which
bears no necessary relationship to the economically correct measure.” Id. at 188–89.
29. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
(1987). Shavell’s detailed examination of damages does not consider the problem of
valuing lives or the inference of the value of a life from precautionary behavior. See id.
at 127–63 (contemplating the problem of discussing damages in general); see also id. at
131–35 (discussing nonpecuniary losses in particular).
30. VISCUSI, supra note 24, at 2, 22.
31. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY
OF STATE COURTS, 1996: [UNITED STATES] (2d ed. 2001), available at http://www.
icpsr.umich.edu/cgi/archive.prl?study=2883 (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
32. Theodore Eisenberg has coded this data set, and he performed these
calculations at my request. Note that Professor Eisenberg maintains a website with
useful statistics on civil trials entitled “Federal District-Court Civil Trials.” Theodore
Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Federal District-Court Civil Trials, at http://teddy.
law.cornell.edu:8090/questtr7900.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
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deviation in damages are reported for each tort category. Thus the data set
contains twenty-eight motor vehicle cases where the winning plaintiff
claimed for wrongful death. In these cases, the median damage award
was $927,125. The median is much smaller than the mean, as explained by
a small number of very large awards that result in a large standard deviation.
TABLE 1
DAMAGES AWARDED IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES
WON BY PLAINTIFFS
NUMBER
MEDIAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

OF

CASE TYPE

CASES

MEAN

Motor Vehicle Tort

28

$2,106,718 $927,125

$2,808,147

Premises Liability

8

1,518,983

449,603

2,697,612

Products Liability: Asbestos

3

1,100,000

350,000

1,430,909

Intentional Tort

5

1,128,826

550,000

1,317,038

Medical Malpractice
Other Negligence

44
17

1,406,098
4,016,988

725,825
754,100

2,481,901
9,174,530

My earlier analysis of fatal risks suggested that appropriate damages
for loss of life are between two and nine million dollars. The median
damage award is typically less than half of the subjective cost of a fatal
risk, but the large standard deviation suggests that damages sometimes
exceed the subjective cost of a fatal risk. These facts correspond to the
intuitive beliefs of some experienced trial lawyers. However, the data
must be treated with caution for several reasons. First, the number of
cases is small, which makes the number unreliable. Second, some
accidents presumably killed more than one person, which biases the
median award as a measure of average damages for a wrongful death.
Third, the damages may include an element of punishment, which biases
the median award upward as a measure of average damages for wrongful
death. Fourth, the cases presumably include some in which the plaintiff
won but not on the wrongful death claim, which biases the median
award downward as a measure of average damages for wrongful death.
Besides analyzing data, I also read individual cases. The National
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Law Journal publishes the 100 top jury verdicts by dollars for each
year.33 The 2001 wrongful death cases suggest to me that wrongful
death can result in very large damage awards when the jury perceives the
defendant as behaving badly and having a deep pocket.34
VII. HAND RULE DAMAGES
This Article advocates computing damages by an approach that
resembles, but is not the same as, the econometric method for estimating
the subjective cost of fatal risks. My approach is based on the Hand
rule, which Judge Hand anticipated in several cases and formulated
explicitly in 1947 in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.35 In Carroll
Towing, Judge Hand applied his rule to a situation where no community
standard existed. So the Hand rule was first used to test whether or not
behavior is reasonable in the absence of a norm. The Hand rule was
subsequently used to test whether or not an existing norm is reasonable.
For example, physicians may develop community standards that serve
themselves better than their patients. The Hand rule can be used to
determine whether or not the community standard of physicians is
legally adequate.36
I am proposing a third way to use the Hand rule. Instead of applying
the Hand rule to standards, I apply it to damages. Computation of Hand
rule damages begins by identifying one or more examples of reasonable
precautions against the loss that materialized. To illustrate, if the loss in
question is a child’s wrongful death, then the court must begin by
identifying a reasonable standard of care towards children. If the legal
rule at issue is negligence, determining liability requires the court to
determine a reasonable standard of precaution. Consequently, the court
must identify a reasonable standard of precaution before turning to
damages. If the legal rule at issue is strict liability, then determining
liability does not require the court to determine a reasonable standard of
precaution. Nevertheless, the court must determine a reasonable standard
of precaution in order to compute Hand rule damages.
Having identified a reasonable standard of care, the court can then
plug its values into the Hand rule to find damages. Hand rule damages
generally equal the reasonable burden divided by the reduction in the
33. See, e.g., Top Verdicts, NAT’L L.J. LITIG. Y.B., 2002, at 45, 47–49.
34. See, e.g., Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. Ct.
2003). My thanks to Debby Kearney for gathering these cases for me.
35. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
36. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding that ophthalmologists
were negligent under a standard of reasonable prudence regardless of the standard set by
the ophthalmology profession).
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probability of harm that it causes. In Hand’s notation, the court must
determine the cost of precaution at the tipping point, or B, and the
resulting reduction in the probability of harm, or P. Having found B and
P, the court then solves the Hand rule for L by using the equation L = B/P.
As noted by Hand rule commentaries, the relevant values are marginal
values of B and P, not total values.37
I contrast this use to Hand’s original use of his rule. If there is no
community standard, Judge Hand requires the actor to take precaution
until the burden B is at least as great as the resulting probability P of an
accident multiplied by the liability L, or B > P x L. The tipping point
between negligence and nonnegligence occurs at equality: B = P x L.
To implement this rule, the court determines liability L and probability
P, solves the equation B = P x L for B, and then compares whether this
value of B is more or less than the defendant’s actual care.
Econometric estimates concern the average subjective cost of a risk
among actual people who face it, whereas Hand rule damages concern
the reasonable person’s subjective cost of a risk. The average person
resembles the reasonable person, but they differ in two important
respects for computing damages. First, when facing risky alternatives,
actual people often make mistakes and suffer regret. The reasonable person,
however, does not make mistakes or suffer regret. Consequently, a
reasonable person’s decisions are free from cognitive biases, computational
inaccuracies, and inconsistent reasoning. Second, some people are
selfish or eccentric. Like children, they have not internalized the social
norms of consideration and prudence that constrain most people. The
reasonable person, however, internalizes social norms of consideration
and prudence. These facts imply that the average person’s behavior
provides evidence about reasonable behavior without being entirely
conclusive. Average behavior must survive critical scrutiny before
concluding that it is reasonable. In this respect, computing Hand rule
damages presents no special problems that courts do not already face
when evaluating community standards.
I explained above that the best available data, which is not very good,
suggests that the subjective cost of a fatal risk typically exceeds the
median damages awarded by courts for wrongful death by more than
200%. Also, the variance in court awards is very high partly because
37. An inspection did not reveal who first stated this proposition, but Posner made
the assertion in RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69 n.2 (1973).
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judges give juries vacuous instructions. Better data from courts would
undoubtedly prompt adjustments in these numbers. Also, critical
scrutiny of average behavior towards risk would undoubtedly reveal
biases and mistakes that require correction. Nevertheless, the magnitude
of the difference between court awards for wrongful death and the
subjective cost of fatal risks is large enough to survive foreseeable
corrections. We are probably safe to conclude that implementing Hand
rule damages would result in a substantial increase in damages for the
most common wrongful death cases involving automobiles.
A pervasive problem in law concerns the extent to which rules should
be particularized. To illustrate, a highway might have a uniform speed
limit for all cars under almost all driving conditions. Alternatively, a
highway might have a variable limit depending on the weather, type of
car, driver’s skill, and so on. Similarly, a method for setting damages
can prescribe the same damages for the wrongful death of anyone, as in
the Laws of Hammurabi, which prescribe the same damages for the
wrongful death of any free man or woman.38 Alternatively, the common
law prescribes different damages for the wrongful death of people who
differ in their earning power and other characteristics.
Similarly, Hand rule damages could be uniform or particularized. To
illustrate, uniform damages could be awarded in wrongful death cases
equal to the average social cost of a traffic fatality as currently specified
by the Federal Highway Administration. Uniformity increases by
pegging damages to the risk behavior of a “reasonable person” who is
generalized rather than particularized.
Alternatively, Hand rule damages might depend on an individual’s
particular precaution against risk. With particularized damages, for
example, wealthy people who spend more on safety might receive higher
damages for a child’s death than poor people who spend less on safety.
This outcome is consistent with the fact that courts award the heirs
higher damages for the death of a high wage earner than for the death of
a low wage earner. Similarly, the heirs of a young man who dies in an
automobile accident might receive less than the heirs of a young woman,
because young men drive much more recklessly than young women as
proved by insurance rates. Perhaps the lower compensation for a young
male driver could be a presumption overcome by the proof that the
young victim was a very careful driver. In practice, however, relatively
simple, uniform damages for incompensable losses are probably best, as
found in some European jurisdictions.39 The adoption of a “reasonable”
38. James Lindgren, Measuring the Value of Slaves and Free Persons in Ancient
Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 163–65 (1995).
39. Some European courts use simple schedules for computing incompensable
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person standard for damages, not just for negligence, would necessarily
put some distance between the law and current U.S. practices of highly
individualized damages.
VIII. EFFICIENCY
Having explained Hand rule damages, I turn to their justification. I
will explain the efficiency justification and then turn to the more
controversial fairness justification. The general form of the efficiency
justification reduces to a few sentences. Hand rule damages are
determined by the reasonable person’s valuation of the risk of loss.
Liability for Hand rule damages generally causes potential injurers to
internalize the reasonable person’s valuation of the risk they impose on
others. Internalization of social costs typically provides incentives for
efficient behavior.
The precise form of this argument depends on the background liability
rule, as well as various behavioral assumptions. I will limit my discussion
to the difference between strict liability and a negligence rule. A strict
liability rule causes a rationally self-interested person to balance the cost
of precaution and the resulting reduction in expected liability. With
Hand rule damages, expected liability equals the reasonable person’s
subjective value of the risk. Consequently, a rationally self-interested
person balances the cost of precaution and the resulting reduction in the
reasonable value of the risk. Because a reasonable person values risk
accurately according to its social cost, Hand rule damages cause a
rationally self-interested person to balance the social cost and benefits of
precaution as required for efficiency.
This analysis extends to liability for losses under a negligence rule. If
the legal standard is clear and courts apply it without error, then an
injurer can avoid liability by satisfying the legal standard. Thus, the
rationally self-interested injurer never exceeds the legal standard. What
losses, but the practice is not easy to confirm. I asked Francesco Parisi, a specialist in
comparative at George Mason Law School and the University of Milan, to summarize
the practice in Italy. In a private communication, he said that legislation does not
establish “menu pricing” for compensation of nonpecuniary losses, but several Italian
tribunals (district courts) have informally adopted menu prices as a presumptive benchmark.
These values were borrowed (with some adjustments) from insurance company
guidelines for compensation. While these presumptive valuations do not eliminate the
right of the parties to prove higher damages, given the difficulties of proof, the default
compensation is accepted in most cases.
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about falling short of the legal standard? The incentive for negligence
depends on the level of liability. If liability for deficient precaution
equals Hand rule damages, then the potential injurer whose precaution
falls short of the legal standard internalizes its social costs and benefits.
Thus, Hand rule damages cause the injurer to fall short of the legal
standard to the exact extent required by social efficiency and no further.
If the legal standard is set at the efficient level of care, and the Hand rule
sets damages, then the rationally self-interested actor exactly satisfies the
legal standard. If the legal standard is set above the efficient level of
care, and the Hand rule sets damages, then the rationally self-interested
actor takes the socially efficient level of care and falls short of the legal
standard.
I have discussed the justification of Hand rule damages under a clear
negligence standard that courts apply without error. With some effort,
the argument generalizes to circumstances when the legal standard is
unclear, courts make errors, and actors suffer from lapses. However, I
will not consider these complications here.
I have explained why Hand rule damages provide incentives for
efficient precaution. If the numbers given above are correct, current
practices by courts give deficient incentives. Implementing Hand rule
damages for, say, automobile accidents would result in a sharp increase
in automobile insurance rates and more monitoring of policyholders by
insurance companies. With fewer people driving and drivers taking
more precautions, accident rates would fall significantly. The reduction
in injury risk would be more valuable to reasonable people than the
increase in insurance costs.
IX. FAIRNESS
A fundamental moral principle requires people to treat others the way
they want to be treated. Applying this principle to accidents, a person
should give the same weight to the reductions in risk enjoyed by others
as to his own costs of precaution. A reasonable person acts this way,
whereas a purely self-interested person looks only to his own costs.
Hand rule damages make purely self-interested people act like
reasonable people, so everyone receives the behavior that others owe to
them. Hand rule damages implement the principle that people should
treat others like themselves, which I presume is morally good.
Besides this simple moral argument, I want to justify Hand rule
damages in terms acceptable under some theories of corrective justice.40
40. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990); Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and
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In daily life people necessarily impose risks on each other, including the
risk of accidents that cause incompensable harms. A fundamental principal
of fairness is that people who impose costs on others should compensate
them. Tort liability satisfies this principle by shifting the cost of an
accident to the person who caused it. Costs can be shifted in two
different ways. One way is to hold the injurer liable for exposure to risk.
To illustrate, everyone exposed to risk by a negligent driver could sue
and recover the cost of the risk. Another way is to hold the injurer liable
for materialized losses. To illustrate, when exposed to risk, only those
drivers who suffer an accident could sue.
For practical reasons, tort law almost always proceeds in the second
way. The practical reason for proceeding this way is that few exposures
to risk materialize as losses. Consequently, liability for materialized
losses results in far fewer trials with easier proofs than liability for
exposure to risk. For now, I want to set aside practical considerations
and consider matters of principle.
First, consider liability for exposure to risk. Under ideal conditions,
liability for exposure to risk is efficient because the injurer internalizes
the risks that he imposes on others. In addition, liability for exposure to
risk seems fair by corrective justice standards because the person who
imposes risk on others compensates them. Fairness requires the
compensation level to equal the monetary equivalent of the risk. As
explained, even the risk of incompensable losses usually has a monetary
equivalent. Consequently, liability for exposure to risk is efficient and
apparently fair by corrective justice standards. In the cancer example, it
would be fair to require compensation now for exposure to the risk of
developing cancer in twenty years.
However, some corrective justice theories that only recognize objective
losses must disagree with this conclusion and deny that compensation is
ever due because of exposure to pure risk. In this view, requiring the
person who caused a pure risk to compensate its victims is unfair.
Instead, the objective theory of corrective justice only requires
compensation for those pure risks that materialize as actual harms.
Applying this version of an objective theory of corrective justice to the
cancer example, it is unfair to require compensation now for exposure to
the risk of developing cancer in twenty years, and it is fair to require
Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1990).
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compensation in twenty years for cancer that actually develops.
Second, consider liability for materialized losses. If the loss is
compensable, then compensatory damages for materialized losses are
efficient because the injurer internalizes social costs. In addition,
compensatory damages for materialized losses are fair by corrective justice
standards because the person who causes the loss compensates the victim.
The problem arises with liability for materialized losses that are
incompensable in principle. An incompensable loss has no monetary
equivalent, so restoration makes no sense, and the damages required by
corrective justice are undefined. There is, however, a way to ameliorate
or even circumvent this difficulty and preserve the corrective justice
ideal, at least in one of its versions. Recall that holding injurers liable
for exposing others to risk is efficient and fair under one version of
corrective justice. Under certain circumstances, liability for exposure to
risk is equivalent to Hand rule damages for materialized losses. Given
material equivalence, a regime of Hand rule damages satisfies the
principle of corrective justice to the same extent as a regime of liability
for exposure to risk.
Under what circumstances is liability for exposure to risk equivalent
to Hand rule damages for materialized losses? Before answering this
question, I want to address the version of corrective justice that denies
its relevance. Recall that an objective theory of corrective justice might
refuse compensation for exposure to pure risk because doing so would
be unfair. My discussion of incompensability reveals a serious problem
with this theory. If the loss is incompensable, such as death, then this
version of an objective theory of corrective justice provides no guidance
for setting damages when the loss materializes. To illustrate by the
cancer example, an objective theory of corrective justice might deny
compensation for the cost of pure risk of cancer and insist that damages
are limited to materialized losses and then provide no coherent way to
compute damages when the losses materialize. Perhaps this failure in
objective theories of corrective justice explains some of the present court
confusion with respect to damages for incompensable losses.
Now I return to an explanation of the conditions for material equivalence
between compensation for exposure to risk and Hand rule damages for
materialized losses. An explanation requires an account of insurance
markets. Competition in insurance markets drives premiums towards the
level of expected claims. With liability insurance, expected claims tend
to equal expected liability. Now assume the courts adopt Hand rule
damages, and consider the consequences for liability insurance. In
Hand’s notation, the expected liability of the insured equals P x L.
Competition in insurance markets will cause the insured’s premium to
tend towards P x L. Thus, liability insurance premiums under a Hand
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rule damages regime will tend to equal the injurer’s liability under a
regime of liability for exposure to risk. Insurance markets tend to make
the two regimes materially equivalent for injurers.
A similar proposition applies to victims. Assume away the practical
obstacles and consider how victims would respond to a rule of liability
for exposure to risk. In a regime of liability for exposure to risk, victims
would receive a small amount of damages for each tortuous exposure to
risk and no damages for materialized losses. Consequently, they might
want to insure against materialized losses. Specifically, they would want
to insure against those risks that increase their need for money.
Alternatively, in a regime with Hand rule damages for materialized
risk, victims would receive no damages for exposure to risk and a large
amount of damages for materialized losses. In so far as an incompensable
loss does not increase the need for money, potential victims have no
need for insurance against these losses. Consequently, potential victims
might like to sell some of their liability rights. To illustrate, the death of
a child reduces the financial obligations of loving parents, so few parents
insure their children’s lives. In effect, the tort system gives parents
insurance for their children. Given the opportunity, many parents would
presumably sell their tort rights to recover for dead children and use the
money to spend on their living children. Competition in markets for
unmatured tort claims will tend to cause their price to approach the
expected recovery P x L.41 Thus, a market for unmatured tort claims
would allow victims to create the identical situation for themselves
under a Hand rule damages regime as under a regime of liability for
exposure to risk.
I have explained that liability insurance tends to make the
opportunities of injurers identical under a Hand rule damages regime or
a regime of liability for exposure to risk for injurers and victims, and a
market for unmatured tort claims would tend to make the opportunities
of victims identical under the two regimes. Given identical opportunities, a
rational actor will choose identical outcomes. If a regime of liability for
exposure to risk is efficient and fair, then a materially identical Hand
rule damages regime for materialized losses is also fair and efficient.
In reality, insurance markets are incomplete. The most serious kind of
incompleteness concerns the inability of potential victims to sell their
41. Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV.
383, 399 (1989).
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rights to recover in tort before they get injured. Markets for unmatured
tort claims are thin or nonexistent, mostly because of legal obstacles.
Given this fact, potential tort victims cannot get rid of unwanted
insurance that the tort system gives them. To use the preceding
illustration, many parents would sell their tort rights to recover for dead
children and use the money to spend on their living children, but the law
prevents such sales, so the parents are stuck with too much insurance
and too little income. Removing the legal obstacles to the development
of markets for tort claims and liability insurance would increase
efficiency and fairness. In the absence of these developments, Hand rule
damages for materialized losses is probably the best damages rule
available for incompensable losses.
X. CONCLUSION
I have defined an incompensable loss as a loss with no monetary
equivalent for a reasonable person. When courts must award damages
for incompensable losses, judges do not have a clear theory or replicable
methodology for computing their magnitude. Judges give misleading
and imprecise instructions to juries. Courts should build a theory and
method for damages on the fact that the risk of an incompensable loss
usually has a monetary equivalent. I propose that courts should base
damages on a reasonable person’s point of indifference between the cost
of more precaution and the resulting reduction in risk of an incompensable
loss. Specifically, Hand rule damages equal the reasonable burden of care
divided by the resulting reduction in the probability of liability. Hand
rule damages cause injurers to internalize the cost of the risk that they
impose on others, which is efficient and fair to the injurer. In the
presence of idealized markets for insurance and tort rights, a Hand rule
damages regime puts victims in the same position as a regime of liability
for exposure to risk. A regime of liability for exposure to risk is fair to
victims, at least under some conceptions of justice. Therefore, achieving
fairness to victims under a Hand rule damages regime requires removing
the legal obstacles to markets for torts rights.42
42. For further reading, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
(2d ed. 1996); MARK A. DELUCCHI, THE ANNUALIZED SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE
USE IN THE U.S., 1990–1991: SUMMARY OF THEORY, DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS (1998),
available at http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/publications/1996/RR-96-03%20(01).pdf; WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987);
JAMES MURPHY & MARK A. DELUCCHI, REVIEW OF SOME OF THE LITERATURE ON THE
SOCIAL COST OF MOTOR-VEHICLE USE (rev. version 1997), available at http://www.its.ucdavis.edu/
publications/1996/RR-96-03%20(03).pdf; Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth
Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992); William E. Becker & Richard A. Stout, The Utility
of Death and Wrongful Death Compensation, 5 J. FORENSIC ECON. 197 (1992); John
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Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973);
John E. Calfee & Paul H. Rubin, Some Implications of Damage Payments for
Nonpecuniary Losses, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1992); John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston,
The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory
Analysis, in 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 133 (Martin Neil Baily et al.
eds., 1993); Bruce Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced
Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1487 (1998); Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand
Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1994); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?
Technology, Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 293 (1988); Thomas R. Ireland & John O. Ward, Valuing the Life of a Child:
Broadening the Investment Approach, 7 J. FORENSIC ECON. 179 (1994); Jason S. Johnston,
Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1385
(1987); FED. HWY. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE COSTS OF HIGHWAY CRASHES
(1991); James L. Plummer, The Cost of Substitute Consumption Activities: A Better
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